Abstract. Exclusive employment contracts and collusion on wages are alternative mechanisms that …rms may use to extract surplus from highly productive workers ("stars"). Exclusivity clauses are common in many industries, but the Courts often refrain from enforcing them, citing harm to workers due to restricted turnover. We analyze the interaction between these two channels of surplus extraction and argue that in the presence of collusion, enforcement of exclusive contracts can, in fact, bene…t the workers. We highlight the following trade-o¤: a strong enforcement of exclusivity restricts labor turnover but also hinders the …rms' ability to sustain collusion in the labor market. The latter e¤ect arises because enforcement of exclusivity increases the …rms'punishment payo¤s. We …nd that both perfect enforcement and no enforcement can be socially sub-optimal. A stronger enforcement can improve matching e¢ ciency by rendering collusion unsustainable, and may lead to a more equitable surplus distribution between the …rms and the workers.
Introduction
The individual performance of a worker (or a small group of workers) often has a disproportionately large impact on his employer's pro…tability. The importance of such highly talented workers, or "stars,"is well recognized in many industries, such as …nancial services, information technology, arts and entertainment, news media, professional team sports, etc. (see, for example, Rosen, 1981) . Mutual fund managers widely vary in their ability to pick the right stocks, some artists become the key revenue generator for their production companies, and the viewership of a TV news channel often depend on its panel of star commentators.
But talent is scarce. And even a talented worker needs substantial investments in human capital to reach his full potential. So, if a …rm must invest in young workers with star potential ex ante, the …rm must also ensure that it extracts the surplus generated by the worker if he becomes a star ex post. In his classic treaties on human capital, Becker (1964) argues that such an extraction of surplus is not feasible when all …rms in the industry can compete to poach (or raid) a star worker. As competition dissipates all rents, the initial employer loses his returns on investment and, consequently, the investment incentives are muted. 1 In order to circumvent this problem, the …rms often adopt one of the two policies: (i) implicitly committing to a "no poaching agreement" where all …rms in the industry promise not to poach each other's star employees. (ii) Writing an exclusive contract with the worker that (if enforced by the Court) legally prohibits the worker from accepting employment at a rival …rm. 2 The goal of our paper is to highlight the interaction between these two channels of surplus extraction and to explore the extent to which the Court should enforce the exclusive employment contracts.
Evidence of collusion among employers has been frequently documented both by the popular press as well as in the Court records. For example, in the 1980s several Major League Baseball teams in US were alleged to have colluded on their wage o¤ers to the top players (Gius and Hylan, 1996) . In the arts an entertainment industry, many of the big studios often bargain with the workers collectively as the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP). 3 There is evidence of employers' collusion even in the …nancial services industry. In Cantor v. Liberty (2000) the security brokerage …rm Cantor Fitzgerald alleged that its rival Liberty Brokerage had breached their "no poaching"contract by raiding Cantor's employees. 4 Exclusivity clauses in employment contracts are also extremely common in many industries (see, Bishara, 2006; Kräkel and Sliwka, 2009 ). However, legal scholars have debated extensively on the e¢ cacy of the exclusive employment contracts (Bishara, 2006; Gilson, 1999) . Indeed, di¤erent states in the US have taken varied positions regarding the legal enforcement of such exclusivity clauses (see Malsberger, 1996 , for a state-by-state survey). Some states such as California and North Dakota have adopted an anti-"covenant not to compete" statute, whereas some states such as Massachusetts have held a very favorable view toward enforcing the exclusivity clause in employment contracts. This debate has primarily stemmed from the fact that the enforcement of exclusivity in employment contracts must face a tradeo¤ between labor mobility (i.e., e¢ cient matching) and human capital investment incentives (Bishara, 2006; Posner et. al, 2004 ). 5 We contribute to this debate by highlighting a di¤erent trade-o¤ associated with the exclusivity enforcement: if the employers are likely to collude on their hiring decisions, enforcement of the exclusivity clause hinders e¢ cient matching but also makes collusion harder to sustain. That is, while strong enforcement means that a worker is "freed" less often, a free worker is more likely to bene…t from a competitive labor market, both in terms of e¢ cient matching and higher wage o¤ers. The latter e¤ect originates because strong enforcement of exclusivity clauses increases the punishment payo¤ of a colluding …rm should it deviate from the collusion. We consider the following stylized model to highlight the role of exclusivity enforcement on the …rms'ability to sustain a labor market collusion.
Two in…nitely-lived …rms hire a sequence of short-lived workers, where each worker lives for a "generation." 6 There are two workers in every generation, and the two …rms hire one 1 Also see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) on why …rms may still invest in general human capital in the face of adverse selection in the labor market. 2 In the legal terms, such contracts are also known as "covenant not to compete." 3 See, "Directors reach accord with hollywood studios," by Michael Cieply and Brooks Barnes, New York Times, January 18, 2008. 4 Cantor Fitzgerald v. Liberty Brokerage, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, 2000. 5 In the R&D-intensive industries such as Information Technology, the exclusivity employment clause may also work as a legal mechanism to protect trade secrecy (see Kräkel and Sliwka, 2009 ). 6 In order to stay focused on the role of exclusivity enforcement on labor market collusion, we do not explicitly model the investment incentives of the …rm, and also abstract away from the issues of investment worker each in every generation. Every generation has two periods. At the beginning of period one, both workers are a priori identical, but at the beginning of the second period only one of the two workers becomes a star. The identity of the star is publicly revealed. The productivity of a regular worker is normalized to zero, but a star worker's productivity is strictly positive. While hiring a worker at the beginning of period one, the …rm may o¤er an exclusive contract. At the beginning of the second period, a worker under an exclusivity clause may attempt to void the exclusivity provision by legally "repudiating" the contract. The Court enforces such exclusivity clause with an exogenous probability. 7 If a star is no longer under the exclusivity clause, the rival …rm may attempt to poach the star by making a take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er, and the star chooses his period two employer. However, the …rms may also implicitly agree not to raid each other, in which case the star always stays with his initial employer. Both workers leave the environment at the end of period two and a new generation of workers is hired. Both …rms discount the future payo¤s by a common factor .
Our …rst …nding is that when the Court becomes more favorable toward enforcing the exclusivity clause, the minimum discount factor ( ) that sustains a "no-poaching"agreement between …rms increases. In other words, the more likely the Court is to enforce an exclusivity clause, the harder it is for the …rms to collude in the labor market. The intuition behind this …nding is as follows. Note that the exclusive employment contracts and collusion between …rms in the labor market are substitute methods of appropriating the surplus created by star employees. In the presence of a collusion, exclusivity is often immaterial because …rms agree not to compete for (non-exclusive) stars in the market. But if a …rm deviates from the collusive agreement, both …rms enter into a punishment phase where both …rms compete in wages to hire a (non-exclusive) star employee. In such a punishment phase, the exclusivity clause is highly valuable to both …rms because it is the only channel through which they can extract the surplus created by a star employee. Hence, on the punishment path, both …rms will necessarily o¤er exclusive employment contracts to the worker. Thus, when the Court is more likely to uphold the exclusivity clause, a …rm's punishment payo¤ increases (recall that even on the punishment path the …rms compete in the labor market only when a star's exclusivity contract is annulled by the Court). As the threat of future punishment decreases (i.e., the punishment payo¤ increases), collusion becomes harder to sustain.
Next, we consider a general version of the model by allowing for …rm-speci…c matching gains and heterogeneity in the star workers' productivity. While a regular worker's productivity is still assumed to be zero, a star worker's productivity in a …rm is assumed to be a priori unknown (but is revealed at the beginning of the second period in every generation). The uncertainty over a star's productivity stems from two sources: (i) the star's innate ability varies across workers (but follows a known probability distribution). (ii) A star worker's productivity also depends on the …rm-speci…c matching. With a given probability, the star can be a better match with the rival …rm.
incentives. However, we will later consider a more general model that incorporates …rm-speci…c matching gains explicitly. 7 The likelihood that exclusivity is enforced may be subject to di¤erent interpretations. For example, the uncertainly over enforcement may represent the con ‡icting and changing legal attitudes toward exclusionary rights (see, e.g., Lafontaine and Slade, 2005) . Another reason why enforcement might be uncertain is that the Courts may feel that stipulated damages depart too much from "reasonable" payments, thus dismissing them as inadequate or punitive and refusing to enforce them (see Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and the literature cited there). Moreover, the contracting parties may not know whether the Court will use a speci…c standard for judging the bene…ts and harms due to such conducts. Finally, if the productive interaction between …rm and star extends over many periods, one could interpret the probability of enforcement as the maximum duration of the exclusivity provision that courts are prepared to enforce. Any of these interpretations is well-suited to our theoretical framework.
The general model highlights two important issues. First, it captures the key trade-o¤ with exclusivity enforcement: under strong enforcement of exclusivity clause, a star worker under exclusivity clause is less likely to be able to move to a better matched employer; but conditional on being a "free" star, a worker faces a competitive labor market that ensures e¢ cient matching. Second, when the star's productivity is a priori unknown, the …rms may not be able to extract the entire surplus from the worker even on a collusive path. This occurs because a …rm's gain from deviation from the "no-raiding" agreement increases with the productivity of the star the …rm may attempt to poach. Therefore, the …rms cannot sustain a collusion at a uniform wage. On the collusive path, though there is no turnover, the initial employer must o¤er a higher wage to a star with higher productivity. These two observations lead to two important …ndings, as discussed below.
First, a moderate level of enforcement of the exclusivity clause may be socially optimal, and the optimal level of enforcement increases with the …rm's level of reputation concerns (i.e., the discount factor ). An important implication of these …ndings is that neither of the extreme views of perfect enforcement and no-enforcement of an exclusivity clause may be socially optimal. The intuition is simple. Because both exclusivity and collusion lower social surplus by restricting e¢ cient matching, the socially optimal level of enforcement may be the minimum level of enforcement that renders the collusion between the …rms nonviable Second, even when collusion among …rms is sustainable, a stronger enforcement of exclusivity clause can make the workers better o¤. The intuition is as follows. A stronger enforcement of the exclusivity clause has two opposing e¤ects on the workers'expected wage. A strong enforcement makes the collusion among …rms harder to sustain. So, if the …rms are to collude in an environment of strict enforcement, they must leave a larger share of the surplus to the "free"stars on the collusive path (otherwise, the temptation to cheat becomes too strong, and the collusion cannot be sustained). This e¤ect increases the wage of a free star even when the …rms are colluding. But under a strong enforcement, stars are freed less often. Thus, the star's initial employer is more likely to expropriate the entire surplus created by the star. Depending on the parameter values, the former e¤ect may dominate the latter, making the workers better o¤ (ex ante). An important implication of this …nding is that the Courts'oft-cited argument that enforcement of exclusivity clauses harms the workers may be misguided.
Related literature: This article relates closely to the literature on collusion and exclusive employment contracts, and it attempts to bridge the two in a labor market context.
Starting from the seminal article by Stigler (1964) , there is a vast antitrust literature on collusion among …rms in the product market (see Jacquemin and Slade, 1989 , for a survey; also see Green and Porter, 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; and Athey and Bagwell, 2001 ). However, collusion in the labor market has received relatively less attention in the literature. An important exception is the sports industry, where several authors have studied the alleged collusion among the Major League Baseball clubs in the 1980s (Gius and Hylan, 1996; Vrooman, 1996) . In contrast, the exclusive employment contracts have been studied extensively both by the legal scholars (Bishara, 2006; Gilson, 1999; Posner et. al, 2004; Rubin and Shedd, 1981) and by the labor economists (Berguet, et al., 2002; Franco and Mitchell, 2005; Kräkel and Sliwka, 2009 ). 8 But the literature on exclusive employment contracts has mostly focused on the role of such contracts in fostering investments in human capital and 8 The labor and the law literature on exclusive employment contracts is also closely related to the exclusive contracts literature in antitrust (see Posner, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Rasmusen et al., 1991.) its implications on labor mobility. The impact of exclusivity provisions on the …rms'ability to collude has so far been overlooked. 9 In this article, we attempt to …ll this gap. It is important to note that several authors have emphasized other trade-o¤s that may arise in the context of exclusivity enforcement. Bishara (2006) notes that the exclusive employment contracts must balance the gains from higher investments in human capital with the loss of welfare due to restricted labor mobility (i.e., ine¢ cient matching). This notion is further developed by Posner et al. (2004) in a formal model. Kräkel and Sliwka (2009) highlight another cost of exclusive employment contracts: it can mute the workers' e¤ort incentives by eliminating lucrative outside employment options that would have been available to a successful "free" worker.
Another article that is closely related with our work is that of Berguet et al. (2002) . Berguet et al. examine the role of the no-compete clause when the …rms compete for talented workers. They …nd that in the presence of complete information, …rms set high buy-out fees to constrain the stars'mobility in order to extract the maximum rent from a more e¢ cient rival. Similarly to the literature on compensation damages for breach of contract (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Spier and Whinston, 1995) exclusive rights help the worker-employer coalition to capture a larger share of the surplus gains from turnover. Berguet et al. study the link between the level of transparency about the worker's ability and the use on exclusive rights for rent-extraction purposes. In contrast, we focus on the e¤ects of the legal restrictions on exclusivity on the extent of collusion in the market for talent.
Finally, our analysis of the sustenance of collusion in the labor market bears resemblance with the product market collusion model considered by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . Similar to the setting considered by these authors, we consider an environment where the "state variable," i.e., the quality of the star, changes over time. This leads to the …nding that the collusive wage is not stationary, and even on the collusive path, the …rms may not be able to extract the entire rent from the worker.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The following section presents a simple model of labor market collusion in the face of exclusive employment contracts, and Section 3 highlights the role of exclusivity enforcement on labor market collusion. A more general model with matching and worker heterogeneity is considered in Section 4, and we discuss the impact of exclusivity enforcement on social welfare and distribution of surplus between the workers and the …rms as well as across workers with varying productivity level. Section 5 discusses some robustness issues related to our key …ndings. The …nal section draws a conclusion.
Basic Model
Players: We consider an in…nitely repeated game with two in…nitely-lived principals ("…rms") F 1 and F 2 and a sequence of short-lived agents ("workers") who live for a "generation." In every generation t, there are two agents A 1t and A 2t . Each generation has two periods. 10 At the beginning of period one, each …rm hires exactly one worker who is randomly chosen from the two (A 1t and A 2t ). But in period two, a worker may switch from his initial employer to the rival …rm. 9 The exclusive contract literature in the antitrust context is also silent about the implications of exclusive contracts on product market collusion. However, similar to the existing labor literature on no-compete clause, it has focused on the role of exclusivity in fostering relationship-speci…c investments by the contracting parties (Segal and Whinston, 2000; De Meza and Selvaggi, 2007) . 10 We will denote the life span of a worker as a "generation" (indexed by t, t = 1; 2; :::) and a unit length of time within a generation as a "period."
Stage game: The stage game is de…ned as the game played between the two …rms and each generation of the workers (i.e., A 1t and A 2t ). The stage game has two periods and can be described in terms of its …ve key aspects: technology, contracts, contract enforcement, competition for talent, and the players'payo¤ s. We elaborate below on each of these aspects.
Technology: We assume that period one is the "training" period for a young worker where no production takes place. Once a worker is trained, production takes place in the second period. 11 The productivity of a worker depends solely on his talent or "type." While at the beginning of period one, both workers are a priori identical, a worker's type is publicly revealed at the beginning of period two (once his training is complete). Workers are of two types: "star" and "regular." In every generation, exactly one of the two workers becomes a star. This speci…cation has two implications: (i) star workers are a scarce resource. In the labor market, there are more …rms than "star"workers available for hire. (ii) Because a …rm chooses its worker randomly, at the beginning of period one, both …rms are equally likely to employ the future star.
For both …rms F 1 and F 2 , a star produces a value of v, while the value of a regular worker is 0.
12 In order to abstract from any potential moral hazard issue, we assume that no e¤ort is needed for the production to take place.
Contracts:
At the beginning of period one, each …rm publicly o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it employment contract to one worker who is randomly chosen out of the two. Without loss of generality, we assume that in generation t, F 1 makes an o¤er to A 1t and F 2 makes an o¤er to A 2t . 13 The contract o¤ered by F i (i 2 f1; 2g) is de…ned by a tuple (w i ; e i ), where w i denotes the worker's wage to be paid at the end of the generation, and e i 2 fnon-exclusive, exclusiveg represents the absence or presence of an exclusivity clause that forbids employment with the other …rm during the worker's life span. This assumption is perhaps natural and realistic in our context, since it is virtually impossible for a young worker to borrow money in the market against his unveri…able talent potential. This assumption rules out any up-front transfers from a worker to the …rm.
14 Two other important implications of this assumption are: (i) contracted wage w i 0; and (ii) only a star worker can generate a (strictly) positive surplus for his employer.
Contract enforcement: At the end of period one, the identity of the star becomes public knowledge (i.e., the state of nature is publicly revealed). If the employment contract of the new star includes an exclusionary clause, he may try to get around the exclusivity provision by legally "repudiating"the contract. 15 We assume that the star undertakes a costless legal procedure to try to be released from his contract. Let p 2 (0; 1) be the probability that 11 We do not explicitly model the exact training process in order to stay focused on our key trade-o¤ between exclusive rights and sustenance of collusion. We simply assume that a young worker must receive "on-the-job" training in period 1 to become a productive worker in period 2. 12 In other words, we rule out any …rm-speci…c matching gains. We will revisit this issue later in Section 4. 13 In what follows, whenever the time dimension does not play any speci…c role, we will suppress the time subscript t for the clarity of exposition.
14 As we will elaborate in Section 3.1, the key trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion disappears if the …rms can extract the entire expected surplus from the worker through an up-front payment. 15 Observe that although both the star and the regular worker's contract may include an exclusivity clause, only the exclusivity status of the star is relevant for payo¤s. This is because only the star can generate positive surplus to his employer.
an exclusionary contract will be enforced by the Court of law. We assume that p is exogenous to the model as it depends, by and large, on the preexisting legal environment. 16 Competition for talent: If an exclusionary contract is enforced, a star worker must stay with his current employer and earn the contracted wage w i . Exclusive stars may not accept other …rms' o¤ers. But if a star is non-exclusive, either because his employment contract does not impose exclusivity or because the Court has voided the exclusivity clause, the worker is free to switch employer. If a non-exclusive star is available in the labor market, both …rms can simultaneously make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, or "bid,"for the star, and the star leaves for the highest bidder. We will denote the bid of F i as b i ( 0). A …rm may also decide to abstain from bidding (let b i = 0 denote this case). If no …rm bids for a worker or in case of a tie, the worker stays with his initial employer.
Payoffs: We assume that both the …rms and the workers are risk neutral. The payo¤ of F i in generation t, say it , depends on two issues: …rst, whether F i 's period-one hire, A it , turns out to be the star or a regular worker, and second, whether F i employs the star in period two. Note that F i can employ the star in period two under two circumstances: (i) A it turns out to be a star and F i retains her either because the star is exclusive or the rival …rm refrains from bidding for the star (in this case, F i pays w i to the star), and (ii) A it turns out to be a regular worker and F i successfully poaches the star from the rival …rm (in this case, the star costs b i ). Given that only a star worker produces a positive revenue (v) for the …rm, the …rm's payo¤ in each of these scenarios can be derived as follows:
if A it is regular and F i does not hire the star in period two w i + v b i if A it is regular and F i poaches the star in period two v w i if A it is star and either she is exclusive or the rival does not bid v b i if A it is a non-exclusive star and F i successfully retains her 0 if A it is star and successfully stolen by the rival . Finally, the payo¤ of A it , say u it , is:
w i if there is no bidding for A it , and A it stays with initial employer max fb 1 ; b 2 g if there is bidding for A it , and A it accepts highest bid 0 otherwise .
The outside option of A it is assumed to be 0:
Time line: The timing of the stage game is summarized as follows Period 1: F i makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (w i ; e i ) to A it . If A it rejects, he gets his outside option 0. If at least one worker accepts his corresponding employer's o¤er, the game goes on to period 2. Otherwise the game ends, and all players earn 0: Period 2: The types of the workers are publicly revealed. Period 2.1: The star worker attempts to "repudiate" the exclusivity clause in the initial contract, if any. 16 Note that here we assume that the legal process of repudiating the contract is initiated by the star worker and the bidding takes place once the star is "freed"from his exclusive contract. However, one may also assume that the star worker goes to the Court only if he has an o¤er in hand from the rival. We maintain the former assumption for the sake of expositional clarity. As discussed in Section 5, one can easily modify our model in order to accommodate the latter scenario, and the key e¤ects of our model continue to hold.
Period 2.2:
Exclusive worker stays with his initial employer. A "free" worker may receive take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers b 1 and b 2 from both …rms, and leaves for the highest bidder. End of Period 2: Production takes places, wages (w i and/or b i ) paid, and the game ends.
Repeated game: The repeated game is simply the stage game repeated in every generation. We assume that both …rms have a common discount factor of 2 (0; 1) per generation. So, the life-time payo¤ of F i , say i = P 1 t=0 t it . Neither the …rms nor the workers discount their payo¤s across periods within a given generation.
Strategies and equilibrium:
We will focus only on pure strategies for their analytical simplicity. The strategy of …rm F i has two components. Depending on the history of the game, in every generation, F i decides (i) the contract (w i ; e i ) o¤ered to A it , and (ii) the raiding bid b i if the rival …rm has a "free" star employee. In contrast, the strategy of A it has three components: (i) whether to accept or reject F i 's o¤er in period one, (ii) whether to attempt to repudiate the exclusivity clause (if any) at the end of period one, and (iii) which …rm's bid to accept at the beginning of period two (if there are any bids).
Because we are primarily interested in "collusive"equilibrium outcomes that permit …rms to appropriate the surplus created by stars, we use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in trigger strategies as a solution concept. In the subgame following a defection from the collusion, the …rms revert back to the (static) Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game.
Having …nished with the description of the basic model, we now highlight how the enforcement of the exclusivity clause a¤ects the sustenance of collusion among the …rms.
The impact of exclusivity enforcement on collusion
In this section, we use our basic model to explore the relationship between the level of enforcement of exclusive employment contracts and the …rms'ability to sustain collusion in the labor market. The …rst step toward exploring this relationship is to characterize the solution to the stage game played between the …rms and the workers in a given generation.
3.1. Optimal contract in a stage game. The optimal contract o¤ered by the …rms to the workers can be derived by comparing the …rms' payo¤s from the exclusive and nonexclusive contracts where the associated wage payment is chosen accordingly. Without loss of generality, suppose F 1 's period-one hire turns out to be the star worker. So, if F 1 's contract involves an exclusivity clause and if this clause is enforced by the Court, then F 1 keeps its star worker at the period-one contracted wage w 1 and earns v on him. Similarly, F 2 keeps its regular worker at wage w 2 but earns 0 on him. Thus, F 1 's payo¤ is 1 = v w 1 , and F 2 's payo¤ is 2 = w 2 .
In contrast, if F 1 does not o¤er an exclusive contract or the Court invalidates the exclusivity clause, the star becomes a "free" talent in the market. Because both F 1 and F 2 value the star equally and compete to hire the star worker at the beginning of period two, both bid the entire value of the star. That is, b 1 = b 2 = v. Thus, the star stays with F 1 at a new wage b 1 = v, and the regular worker stays with F 2 at the initially contracted wage of w 2 . The payo¤s of the two …rms are 1 = 0, and 2 = w 2 :
Now, at the beginning of period one, a …rm hires the future star with probability 1=2. Therefore, F i 's ex-ante payo¤ from o¤ering an exclusive contract (enforced with probability p) and wage w i is e i = 1 2 p (v w i ) + 1 2 ( w i ) (the superscript e denotes contracted exclusivity). Similarly, F i 's ex-ante payo¤ from o¤ering a non-exclusive contract and wage w i is ne i =
1
Note that both e i and ne i are decreasing in the o¤ered wage w i . Since the outside option of the worker is 0, and the workers are assumed to be liquidity constrained, it is optimal for F i to set w i = 0 regardless of whether the contract speci…es exclusivity or not. Thus, under exclusive contract F i earns (1)
and under non-exclusive contract, F i earns
Since p > 0, e i > ne i . Therefore, the optimal contract in a stage game is an exclusive contract with w i = 0, and both …rms earn an expected payo¤ e i = pv=2. We complete the discussion of the stage game with the following observation: in our model, the …rms do not incur any additional cost of writing exclusive contracts. This is due to the liquidity constraint on the workers. The liquidity constraint implies that F i must leave rents to the worker. To see this, note that in the second period, a worker is expected to earn 2 pv) that the …rm could have extracted up-front had it not imposed any exclusivity clause. However, the liquidity constraint on the worker mutes this e¤ect by ruling out any up-front payments. Both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts cost the same to the …rms, and this forces the …rms to leave rents to the worker.
More importantly, the trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion is relevant only when the …rms cannot extract the value of a worker up front. If up-front payments from the workers at the contracting stage are feasible, the …rms can appropriate the expected surplus through a suitable (signing-up) fee. Therefore, neither collusion nor exclusive contracts are necessary to extract surplus. As the gains from collusion evaporate, exclusivity no longer plays any role on the …rms'ability to sustain collusion.
Next, we analyze the scope for collusion in a repeated game between the …rms and the multiple generations of the workers.
3.2.
Collusive equilibrium in the in…nitely repeated game. Having characterized the optimal contract in the static game, we now investigate the repeated game where the two …rms may tacitly agree not to compete for a free star in the labor market. That is, we look at a collusive equilibrium where F 1 abstains from bidding for a free star who was initially hired by F 2 , and vice versa.
Under collusion, …rms avert bidding away the value (v) created by a free star. So, in any generation, the value v always accrues to the …rm who hired the star at the outset of period one. Further note that even in a collusive equilibrium the …rms will set w i = 0 since any higher wage would leave rents to the worker. 17 Because in every generation, each …rm hires the future star with probability 1=2, the (discounted) payo¤ of the …rm F i (i 2 f1; 2g) on the collusive path is: 17 In this simple model with homogeneous stars, one can show that if collusion is not sustainable with contracted wages 0 then it is not sustainable with any other contracted wages higher than 0. Two issues are important to note in this context. First, the …rm's payo¤ under collusion does not depend on the probability of enforcement of exclusion (p). This is intuitive since under collusion each …rm is guaranteed to extract the entire surplus from a star regardless of whether the star is exclusive or not. Second, a comparison of equations (1) and (3) implies that a …rm's payo¤ under collusion is exactly equal to the (discounted) payo¤ a …rm will earn in the absence of collusion if exclusive contracts are always enforced (i.e., when p = 1). This observation is also intuitive because exclusion and collusion are two di¤erent mechanisms to ensure that the …rm extracts the entire surplus from a star worker. However, as we will discuss below, the probability of enforcement of exclusive contracts governs the …rms'ability to maintain their collusive behavior.
The …rms can sustain a collusive equilibrium if and only if in any generation, the payo¤ of a …rm on the collusive equilibrium path (as given in equation (3)) is at least as large as its payo¤ from the most pro…table deviation. Suppose in generation t, F 1 has found to have hired a regular worker and deviates from the collusive path by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to F 2 's star worker.
18 F 1 's gains from the deviation is maximized when F 1 outbids F 2 's period-one wage o¤er by a penny. Since F 2 's period-one wage o¤er is 0, by deviating from the collusive equilibrium and poaching F 2 's star worker, F 1 earns a payo¤ of v in generation t. But from generation t + 1 onwards, under trigger-strategies, the …rms enter into the punishment phase where they revert back to playing the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (i.e., static Bertrand-Nash). Using equation (1), the punishment payo¤ of …rm i can be derived as:
Therefore, a collusive equilibrium is sustained if and only if C i v + i ; or,
The above condition clearly summarizes how the enforcement of exclusive contracts interacts with the …rms' ability to sustain collusion. Note that the impact of the exclusivity enforcement originates from the punishment payo¤ of the …rm in case the collusion breaks down. The higher is the likelihood of enforcement, the higher is the punishment payo¤; and hence, the harder it is to sustain collusion.
The intuition behind this …nding is simple. Recall that collusion and exclusive contracts are both means of extracting the entire surplus generated by a star worker. When exclusive contracts are strongly enforced, even in the absence of any collusion, a …rm is assured of the surplus generated by a star worker. Hence, the …rm is more tempted to deviate. Now, condition (5) can be further simpli…ed as (6) 2= (3 p) . 18 Observe that F1's most pro…table deviation must involve a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er so that F2 does not have a chance to respond to F1's bid. Otherwise, any deviation would immediately start a bidding war that would dissimmate all surplus. Nevertheless, this assumption is not essential to substantiate our key trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion. We will revisit this issue in Section 4.
That is, given any p, there is a critical value of ; say := 2= (3 p), such that a collusive equilibrium is sustainable if and only if . The following proposition summarizes this observation. Proposition 1. If 2 [0; 2=3); a collusive outcome cannot be sustained regardless of the value of p. If 2 [2=3; 1], however, a collusive outcome can be sustained i¤ the probability of enforcement satis…es the condition 2= (3 p).
Observe that if is su¢ ciently small (i.e., < 2=3), then the payo¤ on the equilibrium path is even less than the immediate gains from deviation (v). Therefore, no collusion is feasible regardless of the punishment payo¤, and hence, regardless of the enforcement probability p. Figure 1 . Relationship between p and the critical discount factor ( ) above which collusion is feasible.
As summarized by Proposition 1, our basic model captures the key trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion in a relatively simple framework. However, a few issues are important to note. First, in the basic model collusion does not lead to any loss of social surplus. Because the workers are equally productive with both …rms, any restriction on turnover (due either to exclusivity enforcement or to collusion) does not a¤ect the "social surplus,"i.e., the total surplus generated by the two …rms and the two workers taken together. But, if one allows workers'productivity to depend on …rm-speci…c matching, then a restriction on turnover may imply loss of social surplus. Second, the model has important implications for the allocation of surplus between the …rms and the workers. If collusion is sustainable, the workers do not earn any surplus-they earn only their reservation payo¤ 0. But if collusion is not sustainable, then a "free"star keeps the entire surplus. A direct implication of this observation is that stronger enforcement of exclusive contracts always increases the surplus retained by a free star. But such a prediction critically hinges on the assumption that the productivity of a star is a known value v. If one allows for worker heterogeneity with a continuum of worker quality, an increase in exclusivity enforcement may not always bene…t a free star. Finally, the model raises some robustness issues. For Proposition 1 to hold, it is important that the deviating …rm o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in order to avoid any bidding war which would disseminate the entire surplus for the …rms. This is perhaps a natural assumption in this setting, since the deviant …rm would not prefer to give the initial employer any opportunity to respond to its o¤er. However, if in our basic model one does allow for the initial employer to make a counter-o¤er, the trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion disappears. The threat of a bidding war can always sustain a collusion between the two …rms. Also, observe that in the basic model, there is no additional cost to the …rm in writing an exclusive contract with their worker. So the colluding …rms may always write exclusive clauses. However, if one assumes a positive (but small) transaction costs in writing exclusive contracts, the colluding …rms would never write exclusive contracts.
It turns out that a more general model that allows for …rm-speci…c matching and a richer speci…cation of worker heterogeneity not only accounts for the …rst two issues on welfare and allocation of surplus, but also addresses the robustness issues raised above. The following section develops and analyzes such a model.
Impacts on welfare and surplus allocation in a general model
In this section we consider a general model with …rm and worker heterogeneity. Such a model allows us to highlight three salient issues regarding the interaction between enforcement of exclusivity and collusion in labor markets: (i) colluding …rms may write exclusive contracts even when there are transaction costs (e.g., cost of the legal procedure) in writing such contracts, (ii) collusion reduces social welfare by distorting e¢ cient turnover, and (iii) enforcement of exclusivity clauses can a¤ect the allocation of the surplus in favor of the workers.
4.1.
A general model with heterogeneous …rms and workers. In order to allow for …rm and worker heterogeneity, we keep all aspects of our basic model unchanged expect two issues: the technology speci…cation and the assumption on the workers' choice of employer when he faces identical bids. The technology is altered in the following way. As before, we assume that a worker may turn out to be either a regular worker or a star. While the productivity of a regular worker is 0 to both …rms, the productivity v of a star is a priori unknown and depends on his innate quality. However, v is assumed to follow a continuous distribution function F (v) on the support [v; v], where v > 0: In every generation, at the beginning of period two, the identity of the star along with his productivity is publicly revealed.
Even though a regular worker is equally valued (i.e., at 0) by both …rms, a star's productivity with a …rm also depends on the …rm-speci…c matching. We assume that a star of quality v produces a value of v with his initial employer, but produces v + m with the rival …rm, where m = (> 0) with probability , and with probability 1 . In other words, a star is a better match with the rival …rm with probability , but is a better match with the initial employer with probability 1
. We assume that v > , i.e., even the lowest quality star always generates a strictly positive value regardless of the value of the matching gain m.
Finally, we assume that while facing identical wage bids from the two …rms, a worker always leaves for the more e¢ cient …rm when …rms bid competitively, but remains with the initial employer when the …rms are colluding.
In what follows, we analyze the "best" collusive equilibrium of this game from the …rms' perspective. That is, we characterize the collusive equilibrium that o¤ers the highest expected pro…t to the two …rms taken together (i.e., the joint pro…t of the two …rms).
As before, in order to analyze the collusive equilibrium of this game, we start with the analysis of the stage game. Observe that the stage game is identical with the one analyzed in the basic model with two important exceptions: (i) the value of the star is a priori unknown.
(ii) The productivity of the star depends on the …rm-speci…c matching. The uncertainty over the star's productivity implies a trivial change in our initial analysis-in order to derive the expected pro…t of a …rm, one must now also take the expectation over the value v. However, the implications for the matching gains are more subtle. It changes the …rms' bidding behavior. In a stage game the …rms compete in wages to hire a free star. Therefore, for a star with productivity v, the bids of the two …rms, b 1 and b 2 , must be equal to the star's value at the …rm where he is least productive. In other words, when the star is better matched with the rival …rm (an event occurring with probability ), both …rms bid b 1 = b 2 = v, and the rival wins the star. Similarly, when the star is a better match with his initial employer (an event occurring with probability 1 ), both …rms bid b 1 = b 2 = v , and the initial employer retains the star. 19 One can now derive the payo¤s of the two …rms exactly as in the context of the basic model. In period 1, each …rm will make an exclusive o¤er with 0 wage to its initial hire. And in stage 2, the bidding and turnover will follow the pattern discussed above. Thus, if F 1 's hire turns out to be a star with productivity v, F 1 's payo¤ is e 1 (v) = pv + (1 p)(1 ) , and F 2 's payo¤ is e 2 = (1 p) . 20 Because in each generation, each …rm hires the future star with probability 1=2, the total discounted payo¤ of a …rm when they play the static Nash equilibrium in every generation is:
Note that~ is also the punishment payo¤ of a …rm should it deviate from the collusive path. This observation follows directly from the fact that under trigger strategies, following any deviation both …rms revert back to playing the static Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every generation.
Next, we analyze the existence and the characteristics of the most pro…table collusive equilibrium in the in…nitely repeated game. However, compared to the basic model, the heterogeneity in a star's productivity changes our analysis in a substantive way. When the star's productivity varies across generations, so does a colluding …rm's gains from deviation. The gains from deviation increase with the star's productivity level. Therefore, if the …rms attempt to collude on a uniform collusive wage regardless of the quality of the star, such a collusion may not be sustainable. But instead, the …rms can attempt to collude on a wage schedule w C (v) that varies with the quality of the star. 21 Such a wage schedule can ensure 19 It is worth noting that there is a continuum of equilibria in the bidding subgame where both …rms place identical bids b, and b can be any value between the highest and the lowest valuation of the star in the two …rms (e.g., when the rival is a better match, b can be any value between v and v + ). However, it is more natural to consider the equilibrium that yields the highest payo¤ to the winner. 20 To see this, note that if F1 is the initial employer of a star with productivity v, with probability p the exclusivity is enforced and with probability (1 p) the star becomes free. If the exclusivity is enforced, F1 earns v. If the exclusivity is not enforced, the star becomes free. In this case, F1 can retain him only if the star is a better match with F1-an event that occurs with probability (1 ). And in this case F1 bids v . So, when F1 wins the free star, he earns a pro…t of on him. Hence, the total expected payo¤ for F1 is pv + (1 p) (1 ) . Similarly, one can compute the payo¤ of F2. 21 Two issues are important to note in regard to this formulation. First, as we will see below, in equilibrium, w C also depends on the other parameters of the model, p, , and . However, for expositional clarity, we will suppress these arguments of w C function except in cases where they are directly relevant for the discussion. Second, one may also consider a more general formulation where the …rms collude on wages that not only depends on v but also depends on the realized matching gain m. As we will discuss later in Section 5, the that the …rms'gains from deviation does not vary with the star's quality, and consequently, can facilitate collusion. We will elaborate on the derivation of the equilibrium w C (v) shortly.
In order to analyze the most pro…table collusive equilibrium, we need to compare the …rms' payo¤ from the most pro…table collusive outcome with and without the exclusivity clause. First, consider the case where the …rms o¤er exclusive contracts on the collusive path. Clearly, under the optimal exclusive contract, the …rms o¤er a period-one hiring wage 0 to each generation of worker. In period two, under collusion, the …rms refrain from poaching its rival's star and both …rms bid a collusive wage w C (v). As a consequence, the star always stays with his initial employer. Now, suppose in a given generation, F 1 's hire turns out to be a star with quality v. The payo¤ of F 1 in this generation is pv + (1 p)[v w C (v)] and the payo¤ of the rival …rm F 2 is 0. As in every generation both …rms are equally likely to hire the future star, the continuation payo¤ of the two …rms in a collusive equilibrium is:
For a given wage schedule w C (v), collusion is sustained if a …rm's continuation payo¤ in equilibrium is at least as large as its payo¤ from the most pro…table deviation. For any given v, the maximum immediate gains from deviation occur when the star is a better match with the rival …rm, i.e., when m = . In that case, the rival …rm gains v + w C (v) when it deviates from the collusive path by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the star that outbids the initial employer by a penny. So, a collusive wage schedule w C (v) is sustainable in equilibrium if and only if~ C v + w C (v) +~ for all v; i.e.,
Thus, for a given , when …rms use exclusive contracts, collusion can be sustained if there exists a wage schedule w C (v) that satis…es the above condition. Because we are interested in the most pro…table collusive outcome for the two …rms, w C (v) is simply the minimum wage the …rms must bid for a free star of quality v such that the condition (9) is satis…ed.
The analysis for the case where the …rms do not use exclusive contracts is similar. In this case, the …rms'payo¤ on the collusive path is E v w C (v) =2 (1 ), and a collusive outcome can be sustained as long as there exists a w C (v) schedule that satis…es the following "no deviation" constraint:
Note that for a given w C (v), a …rm's payo¤ on the collusive path in absence of any exclusive contract is less than its payo¤ when exclusive contracts are o¤ered. Moreover, a given collusive wage schedule w C is easier to sustain when …rms can use exclusive contracts on the collusive path (i.e., the condition (9) is weaker than the condition (10)).
The following proposition suggests that the …rms can collude in equilibrium as long as is su¢ ciently large, and the …rms will always prefer to write exclusive contracts even on the collusive path.
qualitative nature of our results continues to hold even under this general formulation. However, in this section we abstract away from this general formulation for expositional clarity. Proposition 2. Given p 2 [0; 1), there exists a value of , say~ (p), such that a collusive equilibrium exists if and only if ~ (p). Moreover, in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium, in every generation, in period one, the …rms o¤ er an exclusive contract with 0 wage; and in period two, …rms bidw C (v) for a free star of productivity v, wherẽ
and v 2 (v; v] depends on the parameters p; ; and .
Proposition 3.~ (p)
is increasing in p, and collusion can never be sustained (regardless of the value of p) if <~ (0).
Propositions 2 and 3 have several important implications. First and foremost, similar to the case with our basic model, they capture the key trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion: as the probability of enforcement (p) increases, collusion becomes harder to sustain. The intuition behind this …nding is, however, a bit more subtle under the general model. Here, an increase in p has two e¤ects. As seen in the basic model, an increase in p increases a …rm's punishment payo¤. Thus, …rms need to be more patient in order to sustain a collusion. But, in the general model, there is also a countervailing e¤ect. The level of enforcement (p) also increases the …rms'payo¤s on the collusive path, and collusion becomes easier to sustain. However, the former e¤ect dominates because the marginal e¤ect of enforcement in …rms'payo¤s is higher in the punishment phase than under collusion. 22 Second, in the presence of …rm-speci…c matching gains, collusion can be sustained even if one assumes that a deviation from collusion can trigger a bidding war. We have maintained the assumption that both …rms make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a free star. While it is perhaps a natural assumption in our setting (it is in the interest of a raiding …rm to ensure that the initial employer does not get to respond to its o¤er), this assumption was critical for our key trade-o¤ to hold in the basic model. If a deviation leads to an instantaneous bidding war that dissipates all surplus, collusion is always sustainable; the trade-o¤ between exclusivity enforcement and collusion disappears. In the presence of …rm-speci…c matching gains, the trade-o¤ continues to hold even if one allows the initial employer to match the raider's o¤er. A bidding war following any deviation does not dissipate all surplus because the better matched …rm can win the bidding war at a bid that equals the productivity of the star at the rival …rm. So, a deviation from the collusive path can be pro…table, and the sustenance of collusion depends on the underlying parameter values.
Third, even under collusion, a free star may get to keep a share of the surplus. Note that in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium, a free star below a productivity threshold earns 0 (as is the case with our basic model), but above this productivity threshold, the collusive wagew C (v) is positive and increasing in the star's productivity. The intuition behind this …nding is simple. As discussed before, the gains from deviation increase with the quality of the star. If …rms attempt to collude on a …xed wage, …rms may honor this agreement when the star is of low productivity, but they may be tempted to renege when the star is of high productivity (because there is more to be gained by deviating). One way to get around this problem is to set the …xed wage high enough so that even for the highest productivity star, a deviation is unpro…table. But such an agreement might be unpro…table for the …rm at the …rst place, because it leaves too much surplus with the worker and too little for the 22 Note that under the punishment phase, the …rms have to pay the free stars their competitive wage whenever the exclusivity is not enforced. But under collusion, the …rms only have to pay the collusive wage w C (v) < v. Due to this reason, the marginal impact of p on the punishment payo¤ is higher than its impact on collusive payo¤. colluding …rms. Instead, the …rms are better o¤ by colluding on a wage schedule that is (weakly) increasing in the productivity of the star. By doing so, the …rms ensure that the gains from deviation do not become too large even when the star is of the highest quality. Consequently, collusion becomes easier to sustain. 23 The collusive wage schedule also has important implications for the surplus allocation between the worker and the …rms. We will revisit this issue shortly.
Finally, Proposition 2 also indicates why a …rm would always prefer to write an exclusive contract even under collusion. As discussed above, even the colluding …rms must leave a share of the total surplus with a free star. So, if exclusivity is enforced, the initial employer of the star appropriates an additional surplusw C (v) that would have gone to the worker in the absence of exclusivity. Thus, as long as the probability of enforcement is positive, …rms are ex ante strictly better o¤ by o¤ering exclusive contracts even on the collusive path. Clearly, this observation holds even if there is a transaction cost of writing exclusive contracts, as long as such a cost is not too large.
4.2.
Implications for welfare. The enforcement of exclusivity has important welfare implications. In what follows, we take the "joint surplus" per generation, say S, that the two …rms and the two workers together produce in a given generation as our measure of social welfare. In any generation, the joint surplus is maximized when the star worker works for the …rm where he is a better match. Note that both collusion and exclusive contracts reduces the joint surplus by restricting e¢ cient turnover. Consequently, a high rate of exclusivity enforcement a¤ects the social welfare in two opposing ways: (i) it directly restricts turnover because a star is less likely to be able to "free" himself from the exclusivity clause, (ii) it indirectly facilitates the turnover of a "free"star by hindering collusion in the labor market.
When the Court is too favorable toward enforcement of exclusivity it does reduce the possibility of collusion in the labor market, but it directly restricts the likelihood that a star worker would be able to change his employer even if his turnover may enhance his productivity. On the other hand, if the Court is too reluctant to enforce an exclusivity contract, there is a higher likelihood that a worker may be able to seek employment elsewhere, but it may not be worthwhile for the worker to do so as the …rms are more likely to collude on wages. This observation suggests that neither of the extreme stances of perfect enforcement or no enforcement may be socially optimal. The following proposition further elaborates on this issue. 
where the cuto¤ valuep increases with . 23 This observation is reminiscent of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . Rotemberg and Saloner obtained a result in similar spirit in the context of price-…xing in product markets. They argued that when demand is uncertain, a cartel may agree on setting a low price in the periods of high demand and a high price in the periods of low demand. This happens because …rms have more incentives to deviate in the periods of high demand. A lower cartel price in high demand periods countervails such incentives for deviation and, consequently, makes the cartel sustainable.
Recall that for <~ (0), collusion is not feasible regardless of the level of exclusivity enforcement. Thus, there is always e¢ cient turnover for a free star, and a higher p only reduces the probability that a worker would be able to void his exclusivity clause and switch to the better matched employer. Consequently, the joint surplus is maximized when the Court never enforces an exclusive contract. But if ~ (0), the level of exclusivity enforcement does a¤ect the …rms' ability to sustain collusion. For values of p below a threshold, sayp (which varies with ), collusion is sustainable, and the joint surplus is at its lowest. But collusion breaks down once p crosses this threshold, and a free star can move to the rival …rm whenever he is more productive with the rival. Thus, the joint surplus increases. However, if p is above the thresholdp, a further increase in p has no additional e¤ect on collusion and merely reduces the likelihood that a star would be able to repudiate his exclusivity clause. As a result, p only restricts turnover and the joint surplus starts to decrease with p. Corollary 1. For <~ (0), no enforcement of exclusion is socially optimal. Otherwise, the optimal enforcement is the minimum enforcement level that renders any collusion unfeasible. Moreover, the optimal enforcement level increases with .
Corollary 1 highlights the socially optimal level for exclusivity enforcement: for low when collusion is not feasible, it is socially optimal not to enforce any exclusivity clause. In this case, enforcement of exclusivity can only reduce welfare by restricting turnover. There is no bene…t from hindering collusion since collusion is not feasible to begin with. For higher , sustainability of collusion depends on the level of exclusivity enforcement. Thus, the optimal enforcement is the minimum enforcement level that renders any collusion unfeasible (i.e.,p). Any lower p leaves room for the …rms to collude and distorts e¢ cient turnover of a free star, and any higher p has no marginal impact on collusion but simply reduces the probability that a star can move to a better matched employer. Moreover, becausep is increasing in , the optimal enforcement level increases when the …rms are more patient.
4.3.
Implications for the distribution of surplus. Next, we analyze how the enforcement of exclusivity a¤ects the allocation of surplus between the star worker and the two …rms. In the basic model, under collusion, the …rms extract the entire surplus generated by a free star through colluding on their bids. However, as Proposition 2 highlights, in the presence of the …rm-speci…c matching gains and heterogeneity among the stars'productivity, the …rms may not be able to retain the entire surplus produced by a free star. The allocation of surplus depends on the stars' equilibrium wages along the (most pro…table) collusive equilibrium. Therefore, in order to investigate the role of exclusivity enforcement on surplus allocation, we …rst need to study the impact of p on the collusive wage schedule w C . (In what follows, we denote the w C function as w C (v; p), and the associated productivity cuto¤ level as v (p) in order to explicitly recognize their dependence on p.) Proposition 5. The optimal collusive wage w C (v; p) is increasing in p and v (p) is decreasing in p.
Proposition 5 establishes that stars'wages increase as exclusivity is more tightly enforced by the Court.the level of enforcement of exclusive contracts increases, the future punishments on deviants become less severe. Thus, collusion becomes more di¢ cult to sustain. In order to sustain optimal collusive equilibria, …rms must therefore permit high-ability stars to earn higher wages and content themselves with lower pro…ts. In that way, neither …rm …nds it pro…table to deviate from the agreement. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of p on w C as given by Proposition 5. As p rises from p 0 to p 1 , the wage schedule w C shifts upwards and the cut-o¤ value v decreases. Proposition 5 allows us to explore what happens to the expected discounted payo¤s to stars and the …rms as the probability of enforcement changes. That free stars of relatively high ability earn higher equilibrium wages when p goes up implies that they may actually gain from tighter enforcement of exclusivity clauses. The ‡ip side, of course, is that the stars are less likely to become free. The following proposition summarizes our …nding. There are two important implications of Proposition 6: …rst, our …nding is contrary to the commonly held view that exclusivity enforcement harms the workers and favors the employers. We argue that when collusion among …rms is a concern, exactly the opposite may be true. Second, the changes in the enforcement level need not have the same impact on the wellbeing of all stars. A shift in the legal environment toward stricter exclusivity enforcement may induce a redistribution of expected surplus from top stars to stars of relatively low ability.
The intuition behind this …nding is as follows: when p rises, there are two opposite forces at work: (i) a larger fraction of the surplus created in the market accrues to the colluding …rms because the stars are freed less often. (ii) Collusion is harder to sustain; it leads to a (weakly) higher collusive wage schedule w C and lower expected pro…ts for the colluding …rms. The interaction between these two e¤ects ultimately determines whether the …rms and the star workers lose or gain from a change in the enforcement level. For example, consider a relatively low value of v such that the collusive wage of a free star, w C (v), is low. In such a scenario, as p increases, the marginal loss from the decreasing likelihood of becoming free is low (which is simply equal to w C (v)), and therefore, the second e¤ect of increased collusive wage may dominate. Consequently, the stars are better o¤ when the enforcement likelihood increases. In contrast, when v is high, the colluding …rms need to o¤er premium wage to the free stars. Therefore the marginal loss from being free in the market less often is high. This loss may be large enough to o¤set any marginal gains from the increase in the collusive wage. In this case, the …rst e¤ect dominates, and the star workers are worse o¤ in a heightened enforcement regime.
Discussion
The previous section elaborates on a general model that captures the interplay between the enforcement of exclusive contracts and the …rms' ability to sustain collusion and o¤ers important insights regarding the question of optimal enforcement of exclusivity clauses and its implications on welfare and distribution of surplus. While this model is more robust than the basic model we discussed in Section 2, it abstracts away from several issues that are not only interesting from a technical point of view, but may also be empirically relevant. This section discusses the implications of some of these issues on our …ndings.
5.1.
Pareto improving reallocation of star workers. In some industries, such as professional sports, employers agree to transfer some of their star workers to other …rms in exchange for a "transfer fee." 25 One might be interested to know whether our key …ndings extend to such an environment. The possibility of worker transfers between employers can be easily incorporated in our model by allowing the …rms to renegotiate the allocation of the star when there are matching gains. All our results, except those on e¢ ciency, remain valid in such a setting. 26 Indeed, a higher enforcement of exclusivity increases the …rms'punishment payo¤s, decreasing their ability to sustain collusion in the labor market. And as discussed in the previous section, this e¤ect implies that an increase in the probability of enforcement of such contracts may actually shift the distribution of surplus in favor of the workers. But note that if we allow for an e¢ cient renegotiation of the allocation of the workers, the allocation of the star worker will always be e¢ cient. Consequently, the enforcement of exclusive contracts will not a¤ect the aggregate social surplus.
5.2.
Timing of the raid. We assume that it is the star worker who initiates the legal process of repudiating the exclusivity clause and the bidding takes place after the worker is "freed"by the Court. But such a legal process is often initiated by the raider-the worker attempts to repudiate his initial contract only after he has an o¤er in hand from the rival …rm. However, 25 For example, in soccer, a considerable number of players are transferred every year where the hiring club pays a considerable sum as a "transfer fee" to the incumbent club who had initially signed up the player. 26 A formal analysis of this issue can be found in a previous version of the current paper, Selvaggi and Vasconcelos (2008) .
our model can easily be extended to capture such a scenario, and the key economic e¤ects continue to hold. Consider the following modi…cations to our basic model. 27 Suppose that there are three periods in each generation. A worker's type is revealed at the beginning of period two. A star produces 0 in period 1 and v in both period 2 and period 3. A regular worker produces 0 in all periods. An exclusive contract, enforced by the Court with probability p, ties the worker with her initial employer only for the …rst two periods. A worker is always free to switch jobs in the third period; in other words, a worker cannot remain exclusive throughout his entire career. Both the initial employer and the rival …rm can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the worker at the beginning of period 2 and the worker may decide to repudiate his exclusive contract if he receives an o¤er from the rival. We keep all other aspects of our basic model unchanged. In this setting, under collusion …rms agree never to bid for the rival's star (i.e., neither in period 2 nor in period 3).
Under collusion, the per-generation expected payo¤ of a …rm is v (recall that the total payo¤ from a star in a given generation is 2v and in every generation, a …rm employs the future star employee with probability 1=2). But in the punishment phase, both …rms will compete to hire a star. In period 3, the worker is necessarily free, and the two …rms will bid up to his full value v. In period 2, the rival will bid v for the star (giving the star an expected payo¤ of v (1 p) as the star appeals to the Court to repudiate his exclusive contract) and the initial employer will bid v (1 p). So, the initial employer's expected payo¤ is vp=2. Because the one-shot gain from deviation is larger in period 3 (equals to v), the …rms can sustain the collusion only if
It is clear from the above condition that the higher is the value of p the harder it is for the …rms to sustain collusion. 28 5.3. Exclusive employment contracts with break-up fee. The class of exclusive employment contracts that we have considered in our model simply forbids the worker to accept an employment contract from a rival …rm. In reality, however, many employers o¤er exclusive contracts that allow the worker to switch to the rival …rm provided that the worker pays a pre-speci…ed "break-up fee" to his initial employer (see Aghion and Bolton (1987) on the exclusionary implications of this type of contract in the product market). In fact, in the presence of …rm-speci…c matching gains, the …rms may strictly prefer to o¤er a contract that allows the worker to switch jobs after paying a break-up fee rather than an exclusive contract that outright prohibits job switching. The qualitative nature of our results continue to hold even if we allow for such break-up fee. The intuition is as follows: suppose that a contract is speci…ed as (w; P ), where, as before, w is the initial wage o¤er to be paid at the end of the second period, and P is a break-up fee/penalty that the worker has to pay to the initial employer if she decides to join the rival …rm at the beginning of period two. As before, under collusion, the …rms agree not to hire each other's stars and o¤er collusive wage w C (v) (both when the contract is enforced and when it is not). Note that under contracts with break-up provision, the punishment payo¤ of the …rms will be higher (compared to the case of pure exclusive contracts) because the 27 The general model case is analogous and omited here for the sake of brevity. 28 One can also consider a weaker form of collusion where the …rms agree not to raid each other's worker only at the beginning of period 2. Even under collusion …rms are allowed to compete in period 3. However, when it is possible to sustain such a collusion, it is also possible to sustain collusion in both periods. Hence, if …rms attempt to collude, it is optimal to collude in both periods (in every generation).
…rms will be able to capture some of the matching gains. So, under this class of contracts, for a given level of contract enforcement, collusion is harder to sustain. 29 However, the …rms' punishment payo¤ continues to increase in the level of enforcement, which implies that the stronger is the enforcement, the harder it is to sustain collusion. Because collusion erodes matching e¢ ciency, the optimal enforcement is the minimum level of enforcement that makes collusion infeasible. Moreover, because collusion is harder to sustain when p increases, the optimal collusive wage w C (v) is increasing in p. Consequently, a stronger enforcement may lead to more surplus for the workers.
An important issue to note is that when exclusive contracts allow for break-up (with penalty), the e¢ ciency implications for collusion and full enforcement of exclusive contracts are no longer the same. Collusion necessarily destroys all matching gains that could have been obtained from e¢ cient turnover, whereas full enforcement of contracts with break up fee does leave room for e¢ cient turnover. But, in general, with full enforcement there will be some matching ine¢ ciency because in the presence of a break-up fee it may not be optimal for a star with lower productivity (i.e., low v) to switch jobs even when she is more productive with the rival …rm.
5.4.
Collusive wage contingent on the presence of matching gains. We have maintained a simplifying assumption that the collusive wage w C is not contingent on realization of the matching gains. However, one can conceive a more general setting where the …rms' collusive wage o¤er w C not only depends on the productivity of the star (v) but also on the value of m 2 f ; g in a given generation. The qualitative nature of our results continue to hold in this general setting. In this case, the di¤erence between the payo¤ under collusion and the payo¤ under the punishment phase~ C ~ is given by
) , and the no-cheating condition (9) must be modi…ed as,
Note that when we allow for the collusive wage w C to be contingent on m, the …rms'payo¤s along the collusive path can be higher than the payo¤s when w C depends only on v. That is, making the collusive wage contingent on m helps sustain the collusion. Nevertheless, our key e¤ect of exclusivity enforcement on collusion continues to hold: the higher is the enforcement level p, the harder it is to satisfy the conditions (12) . In other words, a higher enforcement p reduces the …rms'ability to sustain collusion. Furthermore, following the same argument as discussed in the context of our general model, one can show that for a given m 2 f ; g, the optimal collusive wage, say e w C (v; m), satis…es the properties of e w C (v) as speci…ed in Proposition 2, and hence, have qualitatively similar e¤ects on welfare and distribution of surplus. 30 29 Similar to the argument discussed by Aghion and Bolton (1987) , when choosing P , a …rm takes into account two e¤ects. A higher P means a higher compensation when the star switches to the more e¢ cient rival. This is a positive e¤ect. On the other hand, with a higher P it is less likely that the raider-worker pair will …nd it worthwhile to switch job by paying the break-up fee. This e¤ect may imply ine¢ cient turnover, and hence, loss of matching surplus. The optimal P balances these two e¤ects. 30 One can also show that e w C (v; ) e w C (v; ) for all v, and that when e w C (v; ) and e w C (v; ) are both strictly positive, e w C (v; ) e w C (v; ) = 2 .
Conclusion
In this article, we o¤er a stylized model of the labor market for highly talented workers, or "stars." We highlight a scenario where employers groom talented young workers under the threat of having their star employees subsequently poached by rival …rms. In such an environment …rms may adopt one of two channels of surplus extraction from their future star employees: exclusive employment contract (or "covenant not to compete") and collusion among employers that forbids poaching each others'workers. The key e¤ect we highlight in this paper emanates from the interplay of these two channels of surplus extraction.
We argue that a stricter legal enforcement of exclusive employment contracts may hinder collusive behavior among …rms that compete to hire scarce talent in the labor market. This e¤ect stands in sharp contrast with the commonly held view that exclusivity provisions facilitate collusion (see, e.g., Rey and Stiglitz, 1995) , and it has important implications for the optimal enforcement of exclusive contracts and the distribution of surplus between the …rm and the workers. We …nd that it is socially optimal to enforce the exclusive employment contracts up to the extent that it renders collusion unfeasible. Moreover, a stronger enforcement of such contracts can shift the distribution of surplus in favor of the workers. These …ndings suggests that neither of the extreme policies of zero enforcement and full enforcement is optimal and they also call into question the oft-cited views of the Court that the enforcement of exclusivity contracts hurts the workers'interest.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by showing that given p < 1 and parameters , v and v, there exists e (p) such that a collusive equilibrium is sustainable if and only if e (p). We do this in the following three steps.
Step 1.1. For ' 0, no wage schedule is sustainable. When ' 0 the left-hand side of (9) is close to zero. Hence, a wage schedule w C ( ) satis…es (9) only if w C (v) ' v + u; 8v 2 [v; v] . But for such w C (v), the left-hand side of (9) is negative, implying that (9) is violated.
Step
. Next, observe that Ev > v > , which implies that the right-hand side of the above inequality is …nite. Finally, note that lim !1 ( =1 ) = +1. Step 1.3. If w C ( ) is sustainable when = 0 then it is also sustainable when = 1 , with 1 > 0 . This follows by direct observation of (9) .
The fact that in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium …rms o¤er an exclusive contract with 0 wage is trivial. Simply note that …rms gain nothing by committing in period one to a positive wage. Similarly, …rms have no loss in o¤ering an exclusive contract. We next show that in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium …rms bidw C (v) (as de…ned in the statement of the Proposition) for a free star. An important observation in …nding the optimal w C ( ) is the following. Fix the left-hand side of (9) and call it z. Given z, w C ( ) is optimal if and only if, for each v 2 [v; v], w C (v) is the lowest (non-negative) value such that z v + w C (v). That is, w C (v) = 0 if z v + , and w C (v) = v + z if otherwise. The remainder of the proof is established in the following steps.
Step 2.1.
, then optimal schedule is w C (v) = 0; 8v 2 [v; v]. As shown above this wage schedule is sustainable in this case. Clearly, if this wage schedule is sustainable, then it is the most pro…table. In the de…nition of e w C (v) in statement of the proposition, this corresponds to the case where v = v.
Step 2.2.
then the optimal wage schedule is given by e w C (v) with v 2 (v; v). Given z, let b v denote the maximum type of star such that wage 0 can be sustained. That is, b v is such that
The optimal wage schedule must specify w C (v) = 0 if v b v and
But given such schedule the left-hand side of (9) is determined. Thus, w C (v) as de…ned above is indeed optimal if it induces a left-hand side of (9) that is identical to z. That is, we need to show that there is a …xed point. De…ne,
is the left-hand side of (9) given wage schedule with cuto¤ b v. The second term inside the square brackets is obtained by using (13) and (14) 
where the inequalities follow from the fact that in this step we focus on the case where
. Continuity of h immediately implies that h has a zero in [v; v). v in the de…nition of e w C (v) is the largest zero of h in [v; v). Note that v > v even if h(v) = 0. This is because h 0 (v) = 1 =(1 )(1 p)=2 < 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that
, the optimal wage schedule if it exists is given by e w C (v) with v 2 (v; v). The analysis developed in the previous step applies here. In this case h(v) > 0 and as before h 0 (v) < 0. While a zero of h is not guaranteed, h 0 (v) < 0 implies that if it exists then it is larger than v.
Step 2.4. If [ =(1 )](1 p)=2 < 1, no collusion is sustainable. In this case h is an increasing function. Since h(v) > 0, h has no zero. So if there is a sustainable collusion wage it must satisfy v + w C (v) = z for all v. This implies that w C (v) = v + z. But given this wage, we can get the right-hand side of (9) . De…ne e Z(z) = 1 2 1 (1 p)E(z 2 ) = 1 2 1 (1 p)(z 2 ).
Again, a …xed point must exist. So we need to …nd z such that e Z(z) = z. Since [ =(1 )](1 p)=2 < 1, it is clear that such a z > 0 does not exist, meaning that collusion is not sustainable.
In all the cases considered in each of the above steps, when collusion is sustainable, the form of the most pro…table collusive wage is as speci…ed in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. We can write (9) as (15) E v w C (v) sup 0 . This follows from direct inspection of (15) .
Having established the existence of e , it is clear that collusion is sustainable if and only if [ =(1 )](1 p)=2 e , or equivalently, 2e =(2e + 1 p) and p < 1. From this, it follows immediately that (i) collusion is never sustainable if < lim p!0 [2e =(2e +1 p)] = 2e =(2e +1), which is e (0); and (ii) when > 2e =(2e + 1), the minimal delta that sustains collusion e (p) is increasing in p.
Proof of Proposition 4. In each period, total surplus S corresponds to the production of the star worker. A star of type v produces v if he stays with the initial employer, and produces an extra if he joins a better matched employer. When …rms collude, a star always stays with the initial employer. So S = Ev. When collusion is not sustainable, the star switches to a better matched employer if there is one and exclusivity is not enforced. This event occurs with probability (1 p) . So, when …rms do not collude, S = Ev + (1 p) . Finally, note that for < e (0) collusion is never sustainable. For e (0), collusion is sustainable if and only if e (p). Since e (p) is increasing in p, this implies that when e (0), there exists e p such that collusion is sustainable if and only if p e p. Moreover, since e (p) is increasing in p, the cuto¤ e p increases with .
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that > e (0), so that a collusive equilibrium exists for some values of p. Let P [0; 1] denote the set of values of p for which a collusive equilibrium exists and p 0 ; p 1 2 P such that p 1 > p 0 . As a preliminary result, we start by showing that
By optimality of w C (v; p 0 ), w C (v; p 0 ) maximizes E v w C (v) among all the wage schedules w C ( ) that satisfy (9) when p = p 0 . Similarly, w C (v; p 1 ) maximizes E v w C (v) among all the wage schedules w C ( ) that satisfy (9) when p = p 1 . This, together with the fact that if a wage schedule satis…es (9) when p = p 1 then it necessarily satis…es (9) when p = p 0 , immediately implies that E v w C (v; p 0 ) E v w C (v; p 1 ) . The inequality in (16) follows trivially from this and the fact that p 1 > p 0 .
We next show that w C (v; p) is increasing in p. That is, we show that w C (v; . The change in the payo¤ of such a worker with productivity v, when p increases from p 0 to p 1 , is (1 p 1 )w C (v; p 1 ) (1 p 0 )w C (v; p 0 ) and can be written as (19) (
Clearly, for v ' v (p 0 ) (and v > v (p 0 )), (19) is positive, since v (p 0 ) v (p 1 ) > 0 and p 1 < 1 (recall that for p 1 = 1 a collusive equilibrium does not exist). If (19) is also positive for v = v, then all workers are better o¤. If (19) is negative for v = v, then by continuity of (19) in v there exists e v 2 (v (p 0 ); v) such that the payo¤s of workers with productivity v 2 (v (p 0 ); e v) increase when p increases from p 0 to p 1 and the payo¤s of workers with productivity v 2 (e v; v) decrease when p increases from p 0 to p 1 .
Finally, to observe that there are cases in which …rms' expected payo¤s fall when the enforcement level increases, suppose p 0 is such that v (p 0 ) is smaller than v but su¢ ciently close to it so that e v = v. If p increases to p 1 , workers with ability v v (p 0 ) are better o¤ while workers with ability v < v (p 0 ) are either better o¤ or remain the same. Thus, since some types of workers are better o¤ and no type of worker is worse o¤, …rms'expected payo¤s must decrease.
